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Institutional Preconditions for Policy Success 
Blake Hudson* 
Policy failures receive much attention from the public and from policy makers adjusting 
policy in response to failure.  Yet, lessons learned from policy failures are necessarily ex post 
observations.  Not only has the policy failed to achieve its purposes, but a great deal of political, 
institutional, temporal, and economic capital has been wasted.  A new body of literature on 
policy success undertakes ex ante analysis of successful policy designs, instrument choices, and 
other policy-making variables to establish a framework for more effective policy making.  
Though policy success may be inhibited by a variety of procedural, programmatic, or political 
factors, institutional analysis—and specifically constitutional constraints on a government’s 
ability to craft certain policy instruments—has not yet been incorporated into the policy success 
and various other policy studies literatures.  This Article is the first to undertake that integration 
and demonstrates how institutional analysis in earlier stages of the policy cycle can help society 
avoid constitutionally driven policy failures and move toward institutional policy successes.  
Only when this institutional precondition is achieved will the procedural, programmatic, and 
political components of a policy have an opportunity to succeed. 
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Institutions do not suddenly appear fully formed; they have to be 
invented.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In policy making, as with so many aspects of modern culture, 
society pays close attention to policy weaknesses and failures.  
Consider the recent launch of the Affordable Care Act (colloquially 
known as “Obamacare”).  The difficulties experienced in the initial 
administration of the act rallied the detractors of the new health care 
law and equally unnerved the policy’s supporters.2  It remains to be 
seen whether Obamacare will be considered a substantively successful 
policy in the vein of, for example, federal regulation of air quality 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA),3 or rather a failure along the lines of 
federal government control over the airline industry.4  Obamacare may 
very well be viewed along a spectrum, as are most policies, with some 
successes and some failures.  Supporters may continue to promote the 
                                                 
 1. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Choice of Governing Instrument:  A Retrospective, in 
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE 51, 69 (Pearl Eliadis et al. 
eds., 2005). 
 2. See Ezra Klein, Five Thoughts on the Obamacare Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/14/five-thoughts-on-the- 
obamacare-disaster. 
 3. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND 
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170 (2008). 
 4. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., ATA Airline Handbook, EMBRY-RIDDLE 
AERONAUTICAL UNIV. (June 7, 2008), http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/books-
online/1064.pdf. 
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policy as a resounding success, and detractors may continue to decry it 
as a perpetual failure. 
 Policy failure plays an important role in informing society and its 
governments—often painfully—of how policies can lead to 
unintended consequences, how existing policies can be improved, and 
how to engage in more effective policy making.  Unfortunately, lessons 
learned from policy failures are necessarily ex post observations.  For 
example, beginning in the 1970s, some members of the policy-making 
community argued that substantive environmental protection successes 
would result if the government proactively mandated the use of 
double-hulled oil tankers.5  Only after the EXXON VALDEZ spill and 
the failure of the single-hulled tanker policy, however, did the U.S. 
government craft a double-hulled approach.6  It is hardly controversial, 
then, to suggest that rather than forging reactionary policies as a result 
of policy failures, society should base policy on ex ante analyses of the 
necessary ingredients for achieving policy successes.  Framed slightly 
differently, it is important to ask:  what can be learned from arguably 
less enamoring studies of policy success?  And how can those studies 
allow us to shift from reactionary, postfailure policy making to more 
proactive approaches modeled after proven policy successes? 
 A growing body of scholarship establishing a theoretical 
framework for “policy success” posits that we can learn more from 
policy success than from failure.7  While this body of literature has 
passingly made reference to the role of institutions in, specifically, 
facilitating successful policies and, more generally, providing a 
foundational component of the policy success theoretical framework, 
legal institutional analysis has not made its way into this literature in 
any robust manner.  Specifically, while scholars have obviously 
grappled with specific instances of policy failure due to a lack of 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., M. Rosegay-Kott, Comment, The Impediments to Effective Regulation 
of Oil Tanker Traffic in United States Waters, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 97-99 (1979). 
 6. See Richard T. Sylves, How the Exxon Valdez Disaster Changed America’s Oil 
Spill Emergency Management, 16 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 13 (1998); 
Alaric Nightingale & Tony Hopfinger, Valdez Ghost Haunts Exxon with Spill-Prone Ships 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
archive&sid=aBlNZuzlHXOM; Samuel K. Skinner & William K. Reilly, The EXXON 
VALDEZ Oil Spill:  A Report to the President, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 
(May 1989), http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/Exxon 
Valdez_NRT_1989_report_to_president.pdf; Spill Prevention and Response, EXXON VALDEZ 
OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.response 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 7. ALLAN MCCONNELL, UNDERSTANDING POLICY SUCCESS:  RETHINKING PUBLIC 
POLICY 213 (2010). 
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constitutional authority at some level of government8 or due to 
unconstitutional constraints on individual rights,9 the key role of 
constitutions in laying the legal foundation of policy success is under-
studied.  This lack of study has impeded the valuable integration of 
institutional analysis earlier in the policy cycle, so that policy makers 
have tended to learn of institutional failures via judicial assessment 
after a policy has been legislated, implemented, and challenged as 
institutionally inadequate, rather than understand how institutional 
structures may be adapted prior to the enactment of policies. 
 Policy scholars currently divide policy success into three different 
categories.  The first is “process success,” which, of course, is exactly 
what it sounds like—maintaining policy-making processes and 
procedures that can successfully facilitate policy formulation and 
implementation.10  Ensuring notice-and-comment rule making for 
substantive agency actions11 under the U.S. Administrative Procedure 
Act is one example.  Next, “program success” is the traditional way in 
which we might think of policy success.  Program success considers 
the substance of policy rather than the procedures by which it was 
formed12 and weighs the relative values provided by specific policies 
against their costs.  Program success is an objective measure of 
outcomes evaluated relative to original policy goals and based upon 
evidence rather than on political ideology.13  This is how one might 
                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the 
Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005); Blake Hudson, Commerce in the 
Commons:  A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 383 n.45 (2011); Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool:  
State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy:  The 
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
321, 354-61 (2005); Blake Hudson, The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines and the Untold 
Story of the Lucas Remand, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99 (2009); William Michael Treanor, 
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 5 (Georgetown Envtl. Law & Policy Inst. 
Papers & Reports, 1998), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/. 
 10. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 40-45. 
 11. Substantive actions as opposed to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, 
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.  See Spirit of the Sage Council v. 
Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated in part by 411 F.3d 225 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 12. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 45-49.  The legitimacy of the policy’s formation 
can, however, play a key role in whether it is viewed as a success or failure.  Id. at 14.  
Michael Howlett has highlighted substantive and procedural aspects of policy design 
generally.  See Michael Howlett & Raul P. Lejano, Tales from the Crypt:  The Rise and Fall 
(and Rebirth?) of Policy Design, 45 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 357, 360 (2013). 
 13. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 49-54; see also Wayne Parsons, From Muddling 
Through to Muddling Up—Evidence Based Policy Making and the Modernisation of British 
Government, 17 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 43 (2002) (analyzing evidence-based policy making in 
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analyze whether the CAA, federal regulation of the airline industry, 
and Obamacare may be deemed relative successes or failures.  Finally, 
“political success” is whether the processes utilized and the programs 
implemented actually lead to good political outcomes for the 
government enacting those policies.14  This is the component of policy 
making whereby supporters of the policy may subjectively view it as a 
success, and the policy’s detractors might characterize it as a failure, 
rather than an objective analysis of policy goals versus outcomes.  True 
political success would engender a broader swath of support than may 
be garnered for policies that remain contentious over time. 
 While these three categories provide an extremely useful 
typology of policy success, the typology itself is incomplete.  As this 
Article demonstrates, a fourth category of success is a precondition for 
each of the other three—“institutional success.”  For a policy to be 
evaluated as a process, program, or political success or failure it first:  
(1) must be formulated by a level of government with legal authority to 
engage in the chosen form of policy making and (2) must not unduly 
infringe on the constitutional rights of the parties that it targets. 
 Consider these requirements for institutional success in turn.  
First, what if a level of government does not have the constitutional 
authority to pass a policy, or more specifically is found not to have that 
authority after the policy is passed and even implemented?15  After all, 
this was the basis for the rulings in United States v. Lopez16 and United 
States v. Morrison,17 whereby the United States Supreme Court struck 
down federal statutes aimed at regulatory subject matter traditionally 
reserved for state governments under the United States Constitution 
and thus lying beyond the federal government’s authority.  While some 
scholars may argue that these cases are anomalies,18 that proposition 
simply remains unclear.  Indeed, in the more recent National 
                                                                                                             
the Labour government’s political agenda in the United Kingdom); Ian Sanderson, 
Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2002) 
(emphasizing the need for “a sound evidence base for policy”). 
 14. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 49-54. 
 15. Throughout this Article, whenever constraints on governance authority are 
discussed, the Article is speaking strictly about governance authority to pass prescriptive 
regulatory policies, and not the use of voluntary, financial (subsidies and taxes), or other 
incentive-based policies.  Those are typically available to any government without 
interference from other levels. 
 16. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 17. See 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 18. Professor Claeys, for example, argued that the outcome of the Gonzalez v. Raich 
case indicated that the newly born constraints on federal Commerce Clause authority arising 
out of Lopez and Morrison “passed from youthful exuberance to middle-aged sobriety.”  
Claeys, supra note 8, at 792; see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius19 case (regarding 
Obamacare), Chief Justice John Roberts went out of his way to say 
that the Affordable Care Act would not be constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, but that it was instead constitutional under the 
federal power to tax.20  Taken together, these relatively recent cases 
demonstrate that situations may yet arise where one level of 
government (here, federal)21 is found not to maintain constitutional 
authority to choose a certain policy instrument.  In this way, these 
policies may be characterized as institutional failures—at least at 
certain levels of government.  Furthermore, as described later in this 
Article, this scenario plays out far more often in the context of federal 
preemption of state or local government legal authority or state 
preemption of local authority, whereby lower levels of governments 
would politically engage in successful policy making but are 
institutionally constrained from doing so.22  Thus, opportunities to have 
policy successes undermined by “legal authority” institutional 
vulnerabilities abound. 
 Second, what if a policy is enacted and implemented, but is 
challenged for illegally constraining constitutionally protected rights?  
This is exactly the institutional vulnerability exposed in the case of 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.23  In that case, the state of 
South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act,24 prohibiting the 
development of two beachfront lots, was challenged as an 
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation in 
violation of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.25  The United States 
Supreme Court agreed, and the policy was abandoned.26  The 
Beachfront Management Act was a case of process success because it 
was validly enacted and implemented by South Carolina procedures.27  
                                                 
 19. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 20. See id. at 2587, 2594; Tom Scocca, Obama Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the 
War, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
scocca/2012/06/roberts_health_care_opinion_commerce_clause_the_real_reason_the_chief_
justice_upheld_obamacare_.html. 
 21. Other levels of government may be similarly constrained.  See Blake Hudson & 
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems:  Nested Governance 
Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273 (2013); infra Part II.A. 
 22. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21; Rosenbloom, supra note 8. 
 23. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 24. S.C. CODE §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-30 (2014). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 26. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine:  Using the Takings Clause To 
Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 237 (Gerald Korngold & 
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004). 
 27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991). 
 
 
 
 
2015] PRECONDITIONS FOR POLICY SUCCESS 675 
 
It was a program success because it protected ecosystems and thus 
achieved outcomes matching well with its original goals.28  The 
political success is clearly debatable, though the policy’s supporters 
would at least characterize it as such.  Even so, the policy was 
decidedly an institutional failure.  This is a case of the “infringing on 
constitutional rights” category of institutional vulnerability.  During the 
design stage of the policy, the state simply had not adequately 
considered the institutional (constitutional) constraints that could 
jeopardize the policy’s success nor did it consider how to remedy those 
vulnerabilities before carrying it completely through the policy cycle. 
 Of course, policy successes and failures are effectively the flip 
side of the same coin—the same constitutional conditions that 
contribute to policy failure are the ones that inhibit policy success.  To 
date, however, legal scholars have only discussed in an ad hoc fashion 
how constitutional constraints on governance authority have inhibited 
policy development.29  Those ad hoc legal analyses often only occur 
after failure—that is, after a court has struck down a policy as 
unconstitutional due to lack of governance authority or because it 
infringes on constitutional rights.  Without a holistic framework that 
integrates legal principles and institutional analysis into the design 
stage of the policy cycle, we will continue to see policy failures 
highlighted far too late and at the evaluation stage, as with the cases of 
Lopez, Morrison, and Lucas.  This is very similar to the more common 
politically driven (rather than institutionally driven) policy failures like 
the EXXON VALDEZ spill, which presented ex post evaluative 
criteria indicating that the substance of a one-hulled policy was a 
failure when utilizing ex ante design criteria might have caused a shift 
to a double-hulled policy before the failure occurred (which would 
have therefore resulted in a policy success).30  While ad hoc accounts 
of policy failures can lead to “policy learning,”31 which may help with 
the design of future policies, a great degree of political, institutional, 
temporal, economic, and natural capital has already been spent on the 
failed policy.  A better approach is to incorporate institutional analysis 
into the design stage of policy development, as an ex ante component 
of policy success instead of an ex post description of policy failure. 
                                                 
 28. Id. at 897. 
 29. See sources cited supra notes 8-9. 
 30. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 31. See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC 
POLICY:  POLICY CYCLES & POLICY SUBSYSTEMS 6 (3d ed. 2009). 
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 Before going further, one point of clarification should be made.  
Governments may fully understand the institutional vulnerabilities that 
can undermine a policy course of action and choose to go forward with 
the policy anyway.  This may either be a political calculation seeking to 
highlight what policy makers perceive as an incorrect understanding of 
the institutional status quo, or rather it may be to test the waters of 
judicial interpretation regarding potential institutional vulnerabilities.  
Regardless, this Article is concerned more with unintentional 
institutional oversights in policy design, rather than those associated 
with political gamesmanship.  Of course, whether a policy is the 
former or latter is not clear-cut, and policies likely fall along a 
spectrum between those extremes.  Yet institutional analysis is 
important nonetheless to allow the most efficient use of political, 
institutional, temporal, and economic capital. 
 This Article brings into the theoretical framework of policy 
success the principle that a precondition for policy success is 
maintaining institutions that are able to fully engage in policy making 
without legal constraint—a task facilitated by the constitutional 
structure and rules of a given governance regime.  Without the 
establishment of such preconditions, we may continue to see the 
failure of important policies at certain levels of government.  Part II of 
this Article describes the institutional vulnerabilities that can inhibit 
policy success.  Part II describes the “governance commons” that can 
arise when a level of government does not maintain the constitutional 
authority to pass a prescriptive regulatory policy, such as when the 
federal government does not have authority under its commerce or 
other powers or when state and local policies are preempted by federal 
or state (respectively) constitutional or legislative provisions.  It also 
discusses how guaranteed individual rights can lead to certain policies 
being more institutionally vulnerable than others.  Part III begins with 
a discussion of the importance of institutions in policy making, 
providing context for the Part’s subsequent review of the policy studies 
literature.  This review walks the reader through the history of policy 
cycle studies, policy design, instrument choice, and policy failure to 
the present-day focus on policy success.  Throughout each of these 
discussions, the Article will situate the role of constitutional 
institutions within these literatures in an effort to integrate that analysis 
into these literatures for the first time.  Part IV will then briefly detail 
practical applications of this integration by evaluating two policy 
arenas where an institution’s role as a precondition for policy success 
will be most critical in the coming years.  These areas are direct land-
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use planning in the coastal zone and private forest management.  Some 
form of prescriptive, minimum-standards policy framework may be 
needed in these areas in the coming decades, especially in light of 
challenges posed by climate change.  Yet these areas are land-use 
regulatory roles long considered the sole prescriptive regulatory 
purview of state and local governments.  Thus, the prescriptive 
regulation of each would potentially unconstitutionally curtail legal 
rights.  As a result, understanding the role that current policy-making 
institutions play in such a regulatory framework’s success will be 
critical. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES:  THE GOVERNANCE 
COMMONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Allocation of Legal Authority as an Institutional Vulnerability:  
The Governance Commons 
 Recent scholarship describes the many ways in which legal 
governance authority in federal systems may be constrained by 
legislative or constitutional provisions.32  In this way, federal systems of 
government may entrench a “governance commons,” whereby in the 
absence of a coordinating authority—or perhaps because higher-level 
authorities interfere with coordination at lower levels—numerous and 
disparate “rational” governments are free to act in their own short-term 
self-interest to the detriment of the federal system as a whole.33  In 
other words, the constitutional structure of these systems makes them 
institutionally vulnerable.  Though the nuance of how these complex 
governance commons operate is beyond the scope of this Article and is 
otherwise documented in the literature,34 an ever-so-brief description of 
the most salient features of the phenomenon is provided here for 
context. 
 One iteration of the governance commons that may threaten 
policy success is encapsulated by the constitutional reasoning 
underpinning the cases of Lopez and Morrison.  Those cases involved 
challenges to the federal government’s authority to regulate subject 
matters that the Court found were traditionally the role of state and 
local governments and outside the scope of the United States 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  The lynchpin of the Court’s 
                                                 
 32. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21. 
 33. BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS:  THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL 
GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014). 
 34. See id.; Rosenbloom, supra note 8. 
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rulings was that the regulated activity in these cases did not involve 
economic activities that could be aggregated to determine whether 
they had a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.35  Similarly, the 
more recent Sebelius case, which tested the constitutionality of 
Obamacare, also called Congress’s Commerce Clause authority into 
question, though the health care law was upheld under the federal 
power to tax.36  The constitutional foundation of other federal 
programs, such as the Clean Water Act’s section 404 wetland-fill 
program,37 have also been questioned by the Court, at least to the 
extent that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might utilize 
that program to regulate land-use activities traditionally subject to state 
regulatory authority.38 
 Another way that institutional vulnerabilities can occur is when 
the federal government uses its recognized authority to preempt 
potential policy successes at lower levels of government (state and 
local governments).39  This happens far more often than do findings of 
constitutional restrictions on federal authority under Congress’s 
Commerce Clause or other powers.40  Congressional preemption under 
the CAA of local government efforts to regulate mobile sources 
provides an example.41  This is a clear case of institutional failure at the 
state or municipal level, but it is a failure compelled by the federal 
government. 
 Similarly, because local governments do not exist under the 
Constitution, state governments must empower local governments 
legislatively or constitutionally through the grant of “home rule” or 
pursuant to “Dillon’s Rule,” and states remain free to withhold or take 
                                                 
 35. Hudson, supra note 8, at 383-84. 
 36. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012). 
 37. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 38. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 39. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 685, 694 (1991); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States:  The Need To Limit 
Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States 
When It Matters:  A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004). 
 40. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal 
Preemption Jurisprudence:  A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (1999).  
Lopez and Morrison remain the only cases since 1937 where a federal statute was struck 
down as beyond the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, 
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 (2001). 
 41. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 
2010); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental 
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184-87 (2006). 
 
 
 
 
2015] PRECONDITIONS FOR POLICY SUCCESS 679 
 
back some of that power through preemption.42  State laws in 
Pennsylvania, for example, have attempted to carve out exceptions 
from local zoning laws for various oil- and gas-related activities, to 
preempt local governments from engaging in regulation of energy 
development, and even to transfer the power of eminent domain to 
natural gas corporations.43  These laws have been challenged as 
unconstitutional by local governments.44  While such challenges have 
been successful in Pennsylvania,45 other states have successfully 
preempted similar local policies.46  Unlike the constraints that lower-
level governments can place on federal authority under Commerce 
Clause analysis, this is yet another compulsion of institutional 
vulnerability by a higher-level government. 
B. Infringement of Individual Rights as an Institutional Vulnerability 
 Distinct from the question of allocating regulatory authority 
between levels of government, some institutional vulnerabilities arise 
because judicial interpretations of individual constitutional rights 
provisions conclude that a policy was enacted or implemented in a 
constitutionally impermissible manner.  The Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution, which states “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation,”47 provides a prime example.  
The volume of scholarship on Fifth Amendment constraints on policy 
success is robust, so this Article only provides a brief example here, 
while Part IV expounds further on other examples salient to the coastal 
zone. 
 As noted in the Introduction, the case of Lucas involved a 
challenge to the state of South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act 
(BMA), which aimed to protect the South Carolina coast from a 
variety of harms caused by coastal development.48  Because the BMA 
barred David Lucas from erecting homes on his property, he brought a 
takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
                                                 
 42. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21, at 1308-09. 
 43. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (2012) (seeking to preempt local zoning 
ordinances that regulate oil and gas operations). 
 44. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006); 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85; Robinson 
Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 45. See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d 901. 
 46. See Energy Mgmt., 467 F.3d 471; Morrison, 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85. 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 48. S.C. CODE §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-30 (2014); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1008, 1022 n.10 (1992). 
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Constitution.49  The Supreme Court ultimately found that any 
regulation that wiped out all economic value in a piece of property was 
categorically a “regulatory taking,” unless background principles of the 
state’s law of nuisance or property inhered in the property’s title.50  On 
remand to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the state was unable to 
prove any such background principles applied and was therefore 
required to pay just compensation to Lucas.51  The state paid Lucas 
$850,000 for the two lots, but then, realizing it would be unable to 
afford implementation of a policy that required this magnitude of 
private landowner compensation, sold the lots and effectively gave up 
on its policy as originally constituted (the lots were later developed).52  
The lawyer for the state of South Carolina, when describing why the 
state pursued implementation of the policy even in the face of a 
takings claim, stated, “The general notion was that if you let this one 
go, then the Beachfront Management Act would tumble into the 
ocean.”53  And that is exactly what happened.  Indeed, South Carolina’s 
action sounded in Justice Holmes’s observation that “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on” if it had to pay for every diminution of property 
value caused by regulation.54 
 A total economic deprivation of property does not occur with 
frequency, and a number of “background principles” have 
subsequently been invoked to overcome these types of takings claims.55  
Nonetheless, at times—as in Lucas—policies do not succeed because 
at the evaluation stage of the policy cycle (here, the judicial stage) it is 
determined that the government did not have authority that it initially 
claimed.56  While a government may have thought it could enact a 
                                                 
 49. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07. 
 50. Id. at 1029. 
 51. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992); see also Oral 
Argument Before the South Carolina Supreme Court on Remand from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Decision, Lucas, 424 S.E.2d 484 (audio recording on file with South Carolina 
Supreme Court Library) (failing to persuade the court that the construction of a home on 
fragile beach land constituted a nuisance); Hudson, supra note 9 (discussing the Lucas 
remand). 
 52. See Been, supra note 26, at 221. 
 53. DVD:  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council at 12:50 (Duke University 
School of Law 2005), available at http://web.law.duke.edu/voices/lucas.  One of the lawyers 
working for Lucas even described the South Carolina Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the 
state prior to the U.S. Supreme Court hearing as encapsulating the following logic:  “if we 
rule . . . with ’em . . . we are going to either gut this act . . . or we are going to break the state.”  
Id. at 17:30. 
 54. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 55. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 9. 
 56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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regulation without paying compensation, it may be required to do so 
after constitutional challenge.  If the government does not have the 
revenue to compensate (and perhaps even if it does), then its 
institutional miscalculation will lead to process, program, and political 
failure. 
 In fact, the way in which the constitutional rights institutional 
vulnerability may be exposed with more regularity is a chilling of 
regulatory policy-making efforts by governments out of concern that 
challenged policies will fail at the evaluation stage if courts order 
regulatory takings compensation.57  Take, for example, Oregon’s 
referendum Measure 37, which required either compensation for the 
adverse economic effects of regulations or a government waiver of 
enforcement of the regulations.58  A study of the effects of Measure 37 
found that in virtually every instance of a claim of diminution of 
property value due to regulation, the government granted a waiver.59  
This is institutional failure. 
 While there are certainly competing values provided by the 
Takings Clause in the form of property rights protections, some 
scholars question whether the Constitution supports a regulatory 
takings doctrine at all.60  In this sense, perhaps the institutional failure 
can be an inappropriate application of a constitutional rule or the 
creation of constitutional rules that are not fully supported by the 
Constitution (at least in the view of some constitutional scholars). 
 Ultimately, constitutional provisions protecting individual rights 
play a role in undermining process, program, and political policy 
success.  These institutional constraints on policy success should be 
integrated more thoroughly into the literature so that institutional 
vulnerabilities can be remedied at the policy design stage, rather than 
                                                 
 57. See Tim Mulvaney, Takings Case Set for Oral Argument at the SCOTUS on 
January 15th, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
environmental_law/2013/01/takings-case-set-for-oral-argument-at-the-scotus-on-january-15th-
.html. 
 58. John D. Echeverria, Property Values and Oregon Measure 37:  Exposing the False 
Premise of Regulation’s Harm to Landowners, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y INST. 4 (2007), 
http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/GELPIMeasure37Report.pdf.  
Measure 37 has since been significantly limited in application by Measure 49.  See Measure 
49 Guide, OR. DEP’T LAND CONSERVATION & DEV. (Mar. 7, 2008) http://www.oregon.gov/ 
LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_guide.pdf. 
 59. Echeverria, supra note 58. 
 60. Treanor, supra note 9, at 1; see also PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND 
SOCIAL MORALITY 286-90, 299-310 (2014) (arguing that property regulations that do not 
affect private owners’ ability to exclude others from the use of their property do not constitute 
“takings” under the Fifth Amendment and therefore should not be subject to the amendment’s 
compensation requirement). 
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at the evaluation stage through judicial review.  The next Subpart 
provides a mechanism for evaluating the role of each of the 
institutional vulnerabilities described above in inhibiting policy 
success. 
C. Institutional Vulnerabilities Within the Precondition Framework 
 Prior research provides a framework useful for depicting how the 
institutional vulnerabilities described in this Part can undermine policy 
success.61  A modified version of this framework is shown infra Figure 
1.  As discussed infra Part III.B., the policy cycle has been studied in 
detail, breaking out policy making into stages of agenda setting, policy 
formulation, decision making, implementation, and policy evaluation.  
Even so, scant attention has been given to the overarching framework 
in which this cycle operates.  Though somewhat oversimplified, at the 
most fundamental level policy success requires the presence of four 
components:  (1) institutional capacity of the government to formulate 
policy, (2) political will of the government to formulate policy, 
(3) institutional capacity of the government to implement policy, and 
(4) political will of the government to implement policy.  These 
components intersect as shown in Figure 1.  The presence of all four 
components indicates a policy success.  When institutional capacity to 
formulate and institutional capacity to implement intersect, we have a 
sufficient policy-making institution.  When political will to formulate 
and political will to implement intersect, we have sufficient policy-
making political will.  Similarly, a government may have both 
institutional capacity and political will to formulate policy, which 
results in successful policy formulation, but it may not have 
institutional capacity and political will to implement, which can 
undermine an otherwise duly constituted policy’s success.  On the 
other hand, perhaps there are sufficient institutions and sufficient 
political will to implement, leading to successful policy implementa-
tion, but the policy itself has institutional flaws (lack of component 1) 
or was crafted in a politically inefficacious way (lack of component 2).  
In this way, all four components must be present before policy success 
can occur. 
                                                 
 61. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of 
Forests in Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, 
Regulating Climate Change]; Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions:  The Keystone of Nested 
Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Nested Commons 
Governance]; HUDSON, supra note 33. 
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 The allocation of governance authority among levels of 
government cuts right to the core of component 1.  Without authority 
to prescriptively regulate, for example, it does not matter if political 
will to formulate a policy exists in combination with political will and 
institutional capacity to implement.  Constitutional infringement, on 
the other hand, more clearly falls into the component 3 category.  For 
example, in the property context the government may very well have 
had the institutional capacity to formulate the policy (i.e., the legal 
authority, component 1), but does not have the institutional capacity to 
implement the policy if it must award just compensation in order to 
make the policy a process and program success. 
Figure 1. 
 Consider some examples that drive home the utility of the 
framework.  First, an example of policy success in the United States—
the CAA.62  The Commerce Clause provides federal regulatory 
authority over regulation of industrial air pollutants (component 1), 
and Congress successfully acted on its political will to regulate those 
                                                 
 62. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2012). 
 
 
 
 
684 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:669 
 
pollutants by passing the CAA (component 2).  The EPA then 
successfully exercised its administrative authority and also enlisted 
state government support in implementing the CAA, which provides 
sufficient institutional capacity to enforce the act (component 3).  
Finally, though enforcement of any statute like the CAA may be 
improved, there also exists sufficient political will to enforce the CAA 
(component 4), as demonstrated by the continued monitoring and 
enforcement actions performed by administrative agencies 
implementing the statute.  The presence of these four components has 
resulted in a successful process, program, political, and, importantly, 
institutional success:  the CAA has sound procedural mechanisms for 
carrying out its dictates (process success); air quality in the United 
States has improved greatly since the passage of the CAA and 
continues to improve (program success); the CAA is widely accepted 
as a valuable and successful regulatory program (political success); 
and the authority of the federal government to formulate and 
implement the CAA stands on strong ground (institutional success). 
 Next, consider the cases of Lopez and Morrison.  In those cases, 
Congress, believing it had the institutional authority to formulate the 
policies in question (component 1), acted on its political will to 
formulate policy by passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the 
Violence Against Women Act, respectively (component 2).63  The 
institutional capacity and political will to implement these policies 
existed (components 3 and 4).  And yet even after the government had 
implemented them, an ex post challenge to component 1 resulted in a 
finding that component 1 did not exist.  The lack of institutional 
capacity (and thus institutional success) created process, program, and 
political failures for these statutes. 
 What about federal preemption, such as our example of mobile 
sources under the CAA?  In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. 
City of New York, the city thought it had institutional capacity to 
formulate a policy mandating heightened fuel efficiency standards for 
its taxi fleet (component 1).64  It crafted a policy to do so out of its 
political will to formulate policy (component 2) and presumably 
maintained the institutional capacity and political will to implement 
the policy (components 3 and 4).  Yet, the federal government stepped 
in and preemptively declared that the city did not have component 1, 
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, 
                                                 
 63. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
 64. 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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thus forcing institutional failure at the municipal level.65  Similarly, 
state governments may preempt or inhibit institutional capacity to 
formulate policy, as have states establishing that local governments do 
not maintain component 1 in the context of natural gas fracking 
regulation.66 
 Finally, consider the Lucas case.  The state of South Carolina 
maintained the institutional enforcement capacity to pass the BMA 
(component 1) and did so via political will to formulate policy 
(component 2).67  For a time, it maintained institutional capacity to 
enforce (component 3) because it did not have to compensate 
landowners for the restrictions placed on private property rights.68  The 
state also maintained the political will to implement the policy 
(component 4), as evidenced by the results the policy achieved on the 
ground, particularly as applied to Lucas (prohibition of development of 
his lots).69  Yet, after a judicial ruling declaring that the regulation was a 
taking of property for which just compensation was owed, South 
Carolina quickly realized it did not have the institutional capacity to 
implement the policy (component 3)—it simply could not 
administratively afford to pay every property owner affected by the 
policy.70  Thus, the policy’s process, program, and political success 
were compromised by an institutional vulnerability. 
 Having detailed the primary types of institutional vulnerabilities 
that can hamstring policy success and raised a few examples of how 
they may arise, the next Part sets to task incorporating the role of 
institutions more fully into the policy literature—culminating with 
their key role in contributing to policy success. 
III. REMEDYING INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES AS A 
PRECONDITION FOR POLICY SUCCESS:  THE POLICY 
LITERATURE 
[U]nless we . . . can offer clear theories of how . . . institutions[] and 
policy are connected and deduce predictions from these theories, we 
shall simply be telling ad hoc stories.71 
                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006); 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85. 
 67. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. David W. Brady, The Causes and Consequences of Divided Government:  Toward 
a New Theory of American Politics?, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 (1993). 
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 To understand the role of constitutional institutions in policy 
success it is useful to first ask:  what is policy study and why is it 
important?  Most simply, “public policy” is “whatever governments 
choose to do or not to do.”72  William Jenkins provided a more detailed 
definition, describing public policy as “‘a set of interrelated decisions 
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of 
goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation 
where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of 
those actors to achieve.’”73  This last part of Jenkins’s definition is 
where constitutional allocation of governance authority and the ability 
of governments to act without violating constitutionally protected 
rights come into play.  Indeed, Jenkins’s work acknowledges that “a 
government’s capacity to implement its decisions is also a significant 
component of public policy” and that “limitations on a government’s 
ability to act can constrain the range of options considered in particular 
decision-making circumstances or can contribute to the success or lack 
of success of policy-making efforts.”74  Most of these limitations have 
been described by policy scholars as including financial, personnel, 
and informational resource limitations; limitations imposed by 
international obligations; or limitations imposed by domestic politics.75  
On the other hand, domestic institutions and legal structures seem to 
have been largely overlooked in this literature. 
 The remainder of this Part describes more fully how institutions 
fit within the many subdisciplines of policy study.  While there is no 
perfect order in which to proceed, the Subparts below review the most 
relevant primary subdisciplines of policy study and detail in particular 
the limited institutional analysis that has been undertaken in those 
areas (at least with regard to legal institutions).  This survey of policy 
studies literature highlights the repeated absence of analysis of how 
constitutional institutions allocate governance authority among levels 
of government or may be constrained by individual rights 
considerations.  The Part makes an initial attempt to integrate that 
analysis into the theoretical framework of policy studies. 
                                                 
 72. THOMAS R. DYE, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1972). 
 73. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting W.I. 
JENKINS, POLICY ANALYSIS:  A POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (1978)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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A. New Institutionalism and Constitutions as “Meta-Institutions” 
 Analysis of the institutions that engage in public policy making 
has been said to be the “broadest perspective” in policy studies.76  Even 
so, such analysis typically focuses on the structure of political and 
economic systems through the review of bureaucracy, legislatures, and 
courts.77  These institutions in the United States, however, are 
embedded within a legal, institutional superstructure—that is, the text 
of the Constitution and the canon of constitutional law interpreting its 
provisions.  We can therefore call constitutional law a meta-institution78 
that subsumes all of the typical institutions reviewed in policy studies, 
such as those arising out of the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. 
 Institutions have long been seen to “influence actions by shaping 
the interpretation of problems and possible solutions by policy actors, 
and by constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to 
which they can be implemented.”79  Recently, however, scholars have 
renewed their interest in the role of institutions in policy making, but 
with a slightly expanded focus.  Scholars of “new” (or “neo”) 
institutionalism take the perspective that institutions are independent 
variables that shape policy outcomes80 and “seek[] to identify how 
rules, norms, and symbols affect political behaviour; how the 
configuration of governmental institutions affects what the state does; 
and how unique patterns of historical development can constrain 
subsequent choices about public problem-solving.”81  Neoinstitutional-
ism literature has at least cursorily referenced federalism and 
individual rights protections (such as property rights).82  Even so, 
rigorous examination of constitutional governance constraints has not 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 52. 
 79. Id. at 44; accord id. at 262; James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Institutional 
Perspectives on Political Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247 (1996) (published version of the 
Address before the International Political Science Association in Berlin). 
 80. Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 69; see also MICHAEL M. ATKINSON, GOVERNING 
CANADA:  INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993) (examining the structure and impact of 
political institutions in Canada); DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. 
Rockman eds., 1993) (discussing and comparing political institutions in the United States 
with other parliamentary systems); POLICY STUDIES IN CANADA:  THE STATE OF THE ART 
(Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett & David Laycock eds., 1996) (discussing the past, 
present, and future of policy studies in Canada). 
 81. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 44 (citation omitted); accord Fritz 
W. Scharpf, Institutions in Comparative Policy Research, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 762 (2000). 
 82. See sources cited supra notes 80-81. 
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made its way into this literature.83  Despite this lack of attention, it is 
clear that with constitutional institutions “the organization and 
character of . . . institutions play a critical role in determining policy 
outcomes.”84  It has been said that “[i]nstitutions do not suddenly 
appear fully formed; they have to be invented.”85  While this is 
definitely true for agencies, legislatures, and courts, how much more 
so is it true of constitutions, the mother of all other institutions? 
 Neoinstitutionalism builds off of institutionalism’s primary focus 
on formal rules and extends to study the role of power, values, and, 
most importantly for this Article, how the past is a “prime shaper of 
the future.”86  It has not gone entirely unnoticed in the literature that 
institutions include “legal . . . codes and rules that affect how 
individuals and groups calculate optimal strategies and courses of 
action.”87  Yet, constitutional rules established largely at the outset of 
our nation are perhaps the most important shaper of the future of U.S. 
policy, and each federal system maintains a unique pattern of historical 
development that constrains policy making to varying degrees.  
Neoinstitutionalists argue:  “[S]tate institutions assume a privileged 
role in the explanation of policy outputs.  They represent a ‘crystalli-
zation’ of the effects of economic factors, ideas, and interests, and they 
constitute the primary vehicle through which these factors are brought 
to bear on policy . . . .”88  Indeed, this seems especially true of 
federalism, whereby strong notions of a need for decentralization 
(driven by economic, political, and cultural considerations) remain 
embedded deeply within the institutional structure, as do economic, 
political, and cultural perspectives that inform views on property rights 
and associated doctrines, like regulatory takings.  Though it is true that 
these institutions “also generate ideas and interests through a process 
of institutional evolution over time,”89 the crystallization of ideas that 
occurred long ago—dating back to the Federalist/Anti-Federalist 
                                                 
 83. Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 69. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 223. 
 87. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 44 (citation omitted); accord Elinor 
Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice:  An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 35 (Pail A. Sabatier ed., 
1999). 
 88. NINETTE KELLEY & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE MAKING OF THE MOSAIC:  A 
HISTORY OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 11 (2d ed. 2010). 
 89. Id. 
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debates at the Constitutional Convention in the United States—can 
lead to a policy-making rigidity that is hard to overcome.90 
 Indeed, the Constitution provides good study for “statist” theory.  
It creates institutional inertia by allocating governance authority 
between federal and state governments in a certain manner and by 
setting rules for the protection of individual rights.  When courts 
interpret the Constitution, this inertia gains energy and becomes 
entrenched further over time.  Theories of “statism” stand for the 
proposition that “each political system has an underlying logic and a 
matching set of interrelated institutions that foster certain choices and 
hinder others.”91  Some scholars of public policy note that under a 
statist view, “institutions can only rarely be . . . modified[] or replaced 
without a considerable degree of effort.”92  This is certainly the case 
with constitutions.  In the United States, the unique pattern of 
historical development of constitutional rules regarding certain subject 
areas, like land-use planning and subnational forestry, most certainly 
affect policy making across scales in those areas.  In this way, constitu-
tional institutions may be the poster child for “path dependency,” 
which stands for the premise that “in policy-making, ‘history 
matters’.”93  Path dependency posits that “new decisions are shaped 
and constrained by increasing returns generated by the costs of 
continuing with existing trajectories and the high costs of alternative 
trajectories.”94  Constitutions perhaps form the basis for some of the 
most stringent forms of “policy legacies,” which show that “once a 
system is in place, it tends to perpetuate itself by limiting the range of 
choices or the ability of forces both outside (‘exogenous’) and inside 
(‘endogenous’) the system to alter that trajectory.”95 
 Despite the fact that institutions like constitutions are hard to 
change, they need to be understood as a key component of policy 
success theory.  Failure to recognize institutional success as a 
precondition for process, program, and political policy success will 
inhibit policy makers’ and advocates’ ability to identify what types of 
                                                 
 90. Though ideas and values may have shifted toward a desire to change the 
constitutional status quo, they may not have shifted enough to meet the “super-supermajority” 
thresholds required for institutional reforms.  See infra text accompanying note 170. 
 91. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 45; accord Introduction to Varieties 
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:  THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
 92. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 52. 
 93. Id. at 200. 
 94. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 223; accord Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path 
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). 
 95. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 200. 
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institutional alterations are needed—either through constitutional 
amendment or judicial interpretation.  In contrast, recognizing 
institutional vulnerabilities will help policy makers alter policy-
instrument choice to the extent that such vulnerabilities cannot be 
overcome at the time of policy design, such as through choosing 
incentive-based instruments over prescriptive ones. 
B. The Policy Cycle:  Integrating Institutional Analysis into the 
Cycle 
 Policy studies have historically focused on the series of stages 
through which policy making occurs—known as the “policy cycle.”96  
These stages are often set out in a linear fashion as a discrete series of 
sequential steps.  Over time, however, the term “cycle” has become a 
preferred descriptor, because the stages do not always occur linearly, 
but rather can occur nonsequentially with each stage often feeding 
back into an earlier stage of the cycle. 
 One of the early pioneers of policy studies, Harold Lasswell, 
divided the policy-making process into seven stages,97 and he was 
followed by numerous scholars who slightly modified his original 
stages but maintained the overall “logic” of analysis.98  Ultimately, the 
logic of modern policy studies distills the policy cycle into five stages:  
(1) agenda setting,99 (2) policy formulation, (3) decision making, 
(4) policy implementation, and (5) policy evaluation.100 
 The policy cycle approach has been touted as providing more 
clarity to the dynamics of policy making by breaking policy processes 
into discernable components that can be studied with more focus.101  
These disaggregated components may also be studied relative to each 
other to determine the drivers of policy success or failure.102  The 
approach has been touted as flexible enough to analyze policy across 
virtually all scales, from local governments to international regimes,103 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 92. 
 97. MICHAEL HOWLETT, DESIGNING PUBLIC POLICIES:  PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS 
18 (2011); see also HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES (1971) 
(discussing the development and impact of policy sciences). 
 98. See HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 18. 
 99. Peters and Hoornbeek describe agenda setting as primarily assessing “what is the 
problem?”  B. Guy Peters & John A. Hoornbeek, The Problem of Policy Problems, in 
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 77, 83. 
 100. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 18-19; see also HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra 
note 31, at 3 (explaining how the policy cycle can be broken into successive stages). 
 101. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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and to facilitate the study of a number of nongovernmental actors in 
the policy cycle, including private organizations and citizens.104 
 Michael Howlett and other policy scholars have described the 
stages of the policy cycle as “sequential policy cycle[s] [that] set out 
the basic steps through which policy processes unfold” and asserted 
that the study of “successive iterations of the cycle” will help “improve 
upon policy outcomes.”105  This improvement has become known as 
“policy learning.”106  Though policy learning might typically be 
thought of as learning about which instruments of implementation do 
or do not work to various degrees, we can also understand institutional 
analysis as an important component of policy learning—whereby 
analysts study the constitutional vulnerabilities that allow or constrain 
other instrument choice options and apply those lessons to future 
policy-making efforts.  Sometimes, there may be no learning that can 
help improve a policy.  Rather, there may only be recognition that one 
level of government cannot utilize certain policy instruments due to a 
lack of constitutional authority.  But this is an equally important 
observation to glean from policy studies.  Scholars have noted as much 
by acknowledging that at times entire policy regimes can fail.107  Lack 
of constitutional authority to engage in policy making or a policy’s 
violation of constitutional rights can be a contributor to such regime 
failure. 
 A potential criticism of the policy cycle approach, of course, is 
that characterization as a cycle suggests that policy making typically 
proceeds in a progressive, systematic fashion, which is often not the 
case.108  Policy making may be reactionary rather than proactive, may 
skip phases, and may otherwise occur in a nonlinear fashion.109  
Howlett notes, “The cycle may not be a single iterative loop, for 
example, but rather a series of smaller loops in which, to cite just one 
possibility, the results of past implementation decisions may have a 
major impact on future policy formulation . . . .”110  One of these 
                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 182. 
 108. Id. at 13. 
 109. See id. at 285; DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 9 
(1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science:  Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 
(1972); Arco Timmermans & Ivar Bleiklie, Institutional Conditions for Policy Design:  Types 
of Arenas and Rules of the Game, EUR. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. RES. (Mar. 1999) http://ecpr. 
eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d24abcd8-1d52-4db9-a1e8-1743bb9c88e4.pdf (paper presented 
at the European Consortium of Political Research, Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim). 
 110. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 13-14. 
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smaller loops might occur, for example, due to a judicial ruling that 
takes place in the evaluation stage.  As detailed in Part II.C, the agenda 
may have been set, the policy formulated and implemented, and only 
afterwards does judicial evaluation determine that there was no 
legislative authority to formulate the policy in the first instance, thus 
resetting the cycle to a prior stage in the loop.  In this way, it is true that 
“[a] better model is needed that delineates in greater detail the actors 
and institutions involved in the policy process, helps identify the 
instruments available to policy-makers, and points out the factors that 
lead to certain policy outcomes rather than others.”111  Integrating 
institutional analysis earlier in the cycle and highlighting 
vulnerabilities that can undermine institutional success may increase 
the chances of achieving better outcomes, avoiding the need to 
abandon policies because their unconstitutionality renders their 
process, program, or political success meaningless.  It is therefore 
important to ask:  where is institutional analysis most valuable in the 
five stages of the policy cycle?  The answer is at the policy 
formulation, decision-making, and evaluation stages, described in turn 
below. 
 As scholars have acknowledged, “Policy formulation . . . involves 
identifying both the technical and political constraints on state 
action.”112  Constitutional constraints would be a technical constraint 
under this categorization.  Other scholars have described these types of 
institutional constraints, and in particular constitutional provisions in 
federal systems, as procedural constraints manifesting during the 
policy formulation stage.113  Thorough consideration of such 
constraints may lead to significant changes in the substance of a 
policy—how a government plans to handle potential regulatory takings 
and just compensation claims, for example. 
 Similarly, the decision-making stage is the stage in which policy 
makers make choices about precisely what action (or even inaction) 
the government will pursue.  Undertaking institutional analysis may 
compel inaction, or it may lead to a choice not to pursue prescriptive 
regulatory instruments until the institutional vulnerability can be 
remedied.  Understanding potential institutional constraints on the 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 14 (citation omitted); accord Daniel A. Mazmanian & Paul A. Sabatier, A 
Multivariate Model of Public Policy-Making, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 439 (1980). 
 112. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 30 (citation omitted); accord Peter J. May, Hints for 
Crafting Alternative Policies, 7 POL’Y ANALYSIS 227 (1981); Mara S. Sidney, Policy 
Formulation:  Design and Tools, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS:  THEORY, 
POLITICS, AND METHODS 79 (Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller & Mara S. Sidney eds., 2007). 
 113. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 113. 
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policy chosen can have a significant impact on its viability and 
potential for success.  Yet, institutional analysis is often overlooked in 
the design stage, leaving the evaluation stage as the next step in the 
cycle where any institutional vulnerabilities are likely to be exposed. 
 The evaluation stage of the policy cycle114 is the stage where we 
might hope to avoid questions of whether there is or is not institutional 
success.  In other words, if that question is seriously in doubt by the 
time a policy reaches the evaluation stage—that is, when a judicial 
review of a policy’s constitutionality takes place—then a finding of 
institutional failure will be yet another ex post observation and a waste 
of political, economic, temporal, and other resources.  Generally, the 
evaluation stage is most important for the “policy learning” 
opportunity that it provides.  As policy scholars have argued: 
[P]erhaps the greatest benefits of policy evaluation are not the direct 
results it generates in terms of definitive assessments of the success and 
failure of particular policies per se, but rather the educational dynamic 
that it can stimulate among policy-makers as well as others less directly 
involved in policy issues.115 
In other words, “[I]mprovements or enhancements to policy-making 
and policy outcomes can be brought about through careful and 
deliberate assessment of how past stages of the policy cycle affected 
both the original goals adopted by governments and the means 
implemented to address them.”116  This is most true for process, 
program, and political success analysis because the relative failures 
and successes of policy form the basis of trial-and-error policy 
experiments that can be improved upon over time.117  Peter Hall frames 
this as “endogenous learning,” which he describes as “a deliberate 
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past 
experience and new information” so as to better attain the ultimate 
                                                 
 114. Policy scholars have noted that judicial review may be important to assess 
constitutional provisions related to executive administration of law and even those related to 
the second category of institutional vulnerability highlighted in this Article—an infringement 
on individual rights.  Id. at 189.  No mention is made, however, of the allocation of 
governance authority to specific levels of government.  See Peter D. Jacobson, Elizabeth 
Selvin & Scott D. Pomfret, The Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278 (2001) (analyzing how courts shape health policy). 
 115. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 179 (citation omitted). 
 116. Id. at 180 (citations omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 
 
 
 
694 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:669 
 
objects of governance.118  Thus, policy learning through evaluation can 
help us understand why some policies succeed and others fail.119 
 Yet, an evaluative judicial ruling that finds an institutional failure 
most likely means that the policy must be abandoned.  While this is 
useful for helping policy makers understand that the policy should 
never have been crafted in its then-current form or that the instrument 
originally utilized will no longer be an option, it amounts to a complete 
evisceration of the process, program, and political success that might 
otherwise have been achieved by the policy.  If a judicial body 
determines that a level of government does not have constitutional 
authority to enact a policy or unconstitutionally infringes on individual 
rights, then policy makers are effectively back to square one—the 
agenda-setting stage.  In this situation, a new cycle may involve the 
crafting of a nonprescriptive policy at that level of government.120  That 
policy, in turn, may be unable to achieve robust program success, 
which may be why a prescriptive approach was chosen to begin with.  
Or perhaps the policy just ceases to exist in prescriptive or 
nonprescriptive form and is thus “terminated” no matter how 
important the policy’s programmatic goals may have been.121 
 It is clearly important to integrate institutional considerations into 
policy cycle studies to better understand how issues like constitutional 
authority impact each stage.  Even so, as discussed in the next Subpart, 
institutional analysis should not be undertaken only in a vacuum 
regarding each stage, but rather should be integrated into a broader 
perspective of how we design policies from the time they are 
conceived until the time they are implemented and evaluated. 
C. Policy Design:  Keying on Institutional Design 
Understanding exactly how instrument choices are constrained by 
higher-order sets of variables is thus crucial to making correct policy 
design decisions in specific policy-making contexts.122 
 While the policy cycle might be thought of as analyzing each of 
the iterative stages of the policy-making process, policy design may be 
conceived more broadly as the study of how to create policies that 
effectively integrate each stage.  Policy design studies also assess 
                                                 
 118. Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State:  The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 278 (1993). 
 119. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 180. 
 120. Id. at 191. 
 121. Id. 
 122. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 14. 
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whether and how the overarching design of policy effectuates success 
at each stage and as a result, success of the policy as a whole.  Even 
though policy design is the overarching structure in which policy 
making takes place, it has received far less attention in the literature 
than its constituent components of agenda setting; instrument choice; 
and policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.123  Though it 
may be housed within the study of governance more broadly, Howlett 
argues that governance studies have occurred “without the benefit of 
clear and systematic analysis” of policy design.124  Howlett posits that 
such study is warranted because “the purpose and expectations of 
policy design have always been clear[—]improving policy-making and 
policy outcomes through the accurate anticipation of the consequences 
of government actions.”125 
 How then do institutions, like constitutions, figure into the larger 
study of policy design and, specifically, designs that facilitate 
successful policies?126  The answer is that constitutions are the ultimate 
“designers” of policy in that they establish the ground rules for how 
subsidiary governmental entities may formulate policy, like legis-
latures at one or more levels of government.  They also set the ground 
rules for permissible or impermissible government actions, such as the 
taking of property without just compensation.  The policy design 
literature contemplates policy design’s codependence with the 
institutions that effectuate its purpose, because “policy design is very 
much situated in the ‘contextual’ orientation which is characteristic of 
modern policy science.  That is, it is an activity or set of activities 
which takes place within a specific historical and institutional context 
that largely determines its content.”127 
 Indeed, one of the preconditions for policy design success is “the 
need for designers to thoroughly analyze and understand the ‘policy 
space’ in which they are working” because “policy formulation 
typically occurs within the confines of an existing governance mode 
                                                 
 123. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31. 
 124. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 3 (citation omitted). 
 125. Id. (citations omitted); accord JAN TINBERGEN, THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT 
(1958); J. TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY:  PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN (1956); D.A. Schön, 
Designing as Reflective Conversation with the Materials of a Design Situation, 5 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 3 (1992). 
 126. Though some accounts within the public policy literature highlight the role of law 
in the design of public policy, they focus primarily on “private and public law; private civil or 
tort law and common law; [and] public criminal and administrative law.”  HOWLETT, supra 
note 97, at 85.  There is no substantive discussion of the role of constitutional law within 
these discussions. 
 127. Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
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and policy logic which simplifies the task of policy design.”128  Even 
so, success of specific policies will occur “only if these contextual 
constraints are diagnosed accurately,”129 and “[u]nderstanding exactly 
how instrument choices are constrained by higher-order sets of 
variables is thus crucial to making correct policy design decisions in 
specific policy-making contexts.”130  In particular, studying success in 
an institutional context might help a governance society avoid “lock-
in,” which results when “institutional feedback mechanisms are self-
reinforcing and, therefore, reforms will tend to follow established 
patterns.”131 
 Howlett implicitly hints at the impacts of federal governance on 
policy design:  “Adopting a multi-level, nested model of policy context 
helps clarify what ‘room’ exists at what level of policy for new or 
alternative policy design elements.”132  The clarity that multilevel, 
nested federal systems provide regarding the “room” that each level of 
government maintains is not always clear.133  Nonetheless, in many 
instances it is fairly clear (or at least constitutionally debatable) that 
certain levels of government do not maintain the legal authority to 
utilize certain instruments, such as prescriptive regulation.  This is the 
institutional context within which certain policies are designed in 
federal systems like those of the United States and Canada. 
 Howlett argues that there are three fundamental aspects to policy 
design:  “(1) knowledge of the basic building blocks or materials with 
which actors must work in constructing a (policy) object; (2) the 
elaboration of a set of principles regarding how these materials should 
be combined in that construction; and (3) understanding the process by 
which a design becomes translated into reality.”134  The study of 
constitutional authority in federal systems falls under the first and 
second aspects, which basically entail “understanding the nuances of 
policy formulation,”135 and also impacts the third aspect because 
                                                 
 128. Id. at 141. 
 129. Id. (citing Louis Meuleman, The Cultural Dimension of Metagovernance:  Why 
Governance Doctrines May Fail, 10 PUB. ORG. REV. 49 (2010)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 210. 
 132. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 142 (citation omitted). 
 133. For example, there is great debate under provisions of the U.S. Constitution, such 
as the Commerce Clause, about whether the federal government, state governments, or both 
maintain constitutional authority to prescriptively regulate resources like isolated wetlands.  
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 134. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 139. 
 135. Id. 
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institutional factors that complicate policy formulation prevent certain 
policy designs from becoming reality.  Indeed, we might actually say 
that the study of institutional design is a precondition of the study of 
policy design, because the latter is wholly dependent upon the design 
of institutions from which policy emanates.  In other words, just as 
institutional authority is a precondition to process, program, and 
political policy success, the study of institutional design is necessary to 
understand if and when certain instruments may legally flow from 
institutions.  One of the arguably less obvious, but most important, 
reasons why is because such study can shed light on the historical 
inertia that institutions and especially constitutional law carry forward 
to maintain the institutional status quo. 
 Indeed, constitutional analysis would fit quite well within the 
recent direction of policy design studies, which have analyzed “policy 
regime logics” and “governance modes.”  Scholars have noted that 
because “governance modes typically change only very slowly over 
time, patterns of government instrument choices tend to exhibit a 
surprising amount of similarity within policy sectors and over time.”136  
Thus, once a governance mode is established via constitutional text, it 
is very difficult to change, and certain policy designs may be restricted 
or otherwise limited in scope until a change in the constitutional status 
quo occurs.  So, for example, constitutional design that allows 
unfettered state authority over land-use or subnational forest policy, 
thus restricting the use of prescriptive instruments at the federal level, 
can lock in the use of lax (or perhaps no) protections of natural capital 
within state or local government jurisdictions in the absence of 
changes in constitutional structure (allocation of governance 
authority)—a regime logic the modification of which is a daunting 
task given the history of subnational government authority over land 
use and forests in the United States.  Even so, a change in the 
governance mode may become necessary to forge a new trajectory for 
the policy instruments chosen and for their design.  In fact, 
constitutions may very well be the prime example of how regime 
logics and governance modes maintain instrument choice and policy 
design inertia, even in the face of evidence that better process, 
program, and political success could be achieved with an adjustment to 
constitutional institutions. 
 Ultimately, two of the most important “policy contexts” for 
policy design and its relative success may very well be constitutional 
                                                 
 136. Id. at 140 (citations omitted). 
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allocation of governance authority and limits on a government’s ability 
to restrict certain individual rights—after all, policies may not be 
successful without recognizing these constraints.  In this way, “[t]here 
is a temporal aspect to . . . policy designs [sic] contexts . . . which 
policy designers must also take into account,” and “the leeway or 
degree of manoeuvrability [sic] policy designers have in developing 
new designs is influenced not only by existing contextual factors and 
polity features but also by historical-institutionalist ones.”137  While it 
may be that these statements refer to historical mixes of specific policy 
instruments—prescriptive regulation, taxes, subsidies, market-based 
tools, public disclosure, and so on—this analysis remains no less true 
of the institutions that lay the framework for allowable policy 
instruments and their mixing.  In other words, constitutional inertia 
segmenting authority in a way that fragments policy making between 
levels of government or locking in a particular conception of 
government intrusion into individual rights constrains the leeway 
policy designers have in adjusting that constitutional structure—
primarily because it requires much more than a simple majority to 
change constitutional rules.  For example, changing institutional 
design in the United States either requires explicit changes to 
constitutional text by a “super-supermajority,”138 so to speak, or a 
radical departure from precedential judicial interpretation of 
constitutional text. 
 Each of these factors makes change in institutional design an 
exceedingly difficult task.  Nonetheless, policy design study maintains 
a broad goal of “constructing an inventory of potential public 
capabilities and resources that might be pertinent in any problem-
solving situation.”139  Review of institutional design through a process 
we might call “institutional authority analysis” should be included in 
this inventory.  This analysis would assist policy makers in assessing 
the government’s institutional capacity to create policy on particular 
scales of governance so that it can remedy the institutional deficiency 
                                                 
 137. Id. at 144; accord Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid & Lois R. Wise, Transforming 
Administrative Policy, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 153 (2002). 
 138. See infra text accompanying note 170.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. V 
(describing the process for amending the U.S. Constitution); Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe 
Federalism and Climate Change:  The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. 
REV. 925 (2012) (arguing that governments can remedy constitutional deficiencies to improve 
climate and forest governance). 
 139. Charles W. Anderson, Comparative Policy Analysis:  The Design of Measures, 4 
COMP. POL. 117, 122 (1971). 
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should the value of the desired policy outweigh the value in 
maintaining the institutional status quo. 
D. Instrument Choice and Institutions:  Constitutions as “Meta-
Instruments” and “Policy Supersystems” 
Innovative and effective policy design requires that the parameters of 
instrument choice be well understood, both to reduce the risk of policy 
failure and to enhance the probability of policy success.140 
 Policy instruments may be thought of as the “contents of the 
toolbox from which governments must choose in building or creating 
public policies,” and therefore are an inherent part of policy design.141  
Policy instruments are likely to be networked with a number of other 
instruments in a set of “policy mixes.”142  Importantly, of course, these 
mixes can occur across scales at different levels of government.  This is 
a fact that has not gone entirely unnoticed in policy studies, with 
scholars noting that federal systems in particular “guarantee these sorts 
of intertwined arrangements in virtually all policy sectors.”143  Even so, 
this acknowledgment deals primarily with the politics of federalism in 
complicating policy responses, rather than focusing on the legal, 
institutional complications posed by federalism or the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions related to individual rights.144  As Arthur 
Ringeling acknowledges, “The question of legality of public policy is 
perhaps one of the oldest questions about public policy.  But 
amazingly, for a long time it was almost fully absent from the policy 
sciences.”145  Stated differently: 
Practitioners of the policy sciences almost forgot that governments are 
not free in the instruments they select. . . .  [G]overnments [cannot] act 
without an adequate legal foundation in the law. . . . 
                                                 
 140. Michael Howlett, What Is a Policy Instrument?, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  
FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 31, 49. 
 141. HOWLETT, supra note 97, at 22. 
 142. Hans Th. A. Bressers & Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr., Instrument Selection and 
Implementation in a Networked Context, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS 
TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 132, 135-37. 
 143. Id. at 137. 
 144. Id. at 138-39, 146-47.  Bressers and O’Toole come close to providing a home for 
analysis of legal aspects of policy mixes when they note that one important factor in 
determining the efficacy of instruments is to consider whether multiple levels of government 
are at play, and if so, “[h]ow is the interaction between various levels of governance 
organized?”  Id. at 146.  Clearly, this organization arises from constitutional authority at both 
the national and state levels. 
 145. Arthur B. Ringeling, Instruments in Four:  The Elements of Policy Design, in 
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 185, 187. 
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 So the possibilities available to policy makers in choosing between 
different instruments are to an important extent limited by considera-
tions of legality.  The amazing thing is that practitioners of the policy 
sciences seem to have forgotten this consideration when they developed 
ideas about optimal instrument choice.146 
 Policy scholars have at least begun the journey down this road, 
acknowledging in a preliminary manner the complicating effect of 
federal systems on instrument choice and noting that “[o]ne of the 
most significant aspects of the political system affecting public policy 
is whether it is federal or unitary.”147  These scholars argue that in 
unitary systems “the existence of a clear chain of command or 
hierarchy linking the different levels of government together in a 
superordinate/subordinate relationship reduces the complexity of 
multi-level governance and policy-making.”148  Thus, in nations like 
Britain, France, and Japan, “the national government retains all 
decision-making powers,” and “[i]t can choose to delegate these 
powers to lower levels of government or dictate to them, but the role of 
the central, national government is legally unchallenged.”149  Federal 
political systems, like Australia, Brazil, India, Russia, Canada, and the 
United States, of course, maintain multiple levels of government and 
“are not bound together in a superordinate/subordinate relationship 
but, rather, enjoy more or less complete discretion in matters under 
their jurisdiction and guaranteed by the constitution.”150  Scholars have 
attributed “weak policy capacity” in certain sectors in the United 
States and Canada to federalism151 and in particular note the 
complications posed when each level of government in a federal 
system is “subject to unpredictable judicial review of their measures, 
which further restricts governments’ ability to realize their 
objectives.”152  As a result, “Federalism thus makes public policy-
making a long, drawn-out, and often rancorous affair as the different 
governments wrangle over jurisdictional issues or are involved in 
extensive intergovernmental negotiations or constitutional litigation.”153  
This wrangling driven by constitutional federalism has a marked 
impact on instrument choice. 
                                                 
 146. Id. at 198-99. 
 147. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 59. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  See generally Hudson, Regulating Climate Change, supra note 61. 
 151. HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 31, at 60. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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 The field of instrument choice has been described by scholars as 
“a commitment to understanding policy formulation and 
implementation, as well as the policy-making process itself, by 
focusing on instruments of government action rather than on policies 
and programs.”154  Recent research has been aimed at “improving the 
knowledge framework for evaluating instruments and at providing 
better knowledge about how they contribute to government 
performance overall” to achieve “the fundamental objective of good 
instrument choices:  good governance.”155  These instruments may 
include prescriptive regulation, subsidies and taxation, privatization, 
and information dissemination.156  Each of these involve either the use 
or express limitation of state authority.157 
 While instrument choice scholars have demonstrated interest in 
the nature of regulatory institutions as a general matter,158 one of the 
reasons why legal institutions, like constitutions, have been left out of 
the study of instrument choice is that the field seems to be dominated 
by political scientists and economists,159 and not legal scholars per se.  
Regardless, policy scholars have queried, “What are the constraints 
and impediments blocking optimal instrument use in the design and 
implementation of governance strategies?”160  One of those constraints 
is constitutional and should be more fully integrated into our 
understandings of instrument choice. 
 In fact, we can describe constitutions as “meta-instruments” that 
have the decisive impact on the choice of other instruments, as they 
may make the use of certain instruments, such as prescriptive 
regulation, unavailable to policy makers at one or more levels of 
government.161  Instrument choice theory, while focusing on the 
instruments that arise out of institutions and how they may or may not 
be used to steer policy, has not been sufficiently expanded to study 
                                                 
 154. Pearl Eliadis, Margaret M. Hill & Michael Howlett, Introduction to DESIGNING 
GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 3, 4. 
 155. Id. at 7. 
 156. Id. at 4; see also JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 69-77 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the common tools 
used to manage natural resources). 
 157. Howlett, supra note 140, at 31. 
 158. Margaret M. Hill, Tools as Art:  Observations on the Choice of Governing 
Instrument, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, 
at 21, 28; see also CHANGING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN AND NORTH AMERICA (G. 
Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks eds., 1998) (discussing the importance of political and 
institutional regulation). 
 159. Howlett, supra note 140, at 31. 
 160. Id. at 34. 
 161. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 21. 
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meta-instruments like constitutions.  After all, constitutions give rise to 
all other instruments.  Not only do they lay the groundwork for 
governmental authority (at different levels) to prescriptively regulate,162 
but they also establish spending powers that facilitate subsidies;163 
taxing powers that facilitate taxation;164 powers related to the creation, 
protection, and regulation of private property rights;165 and a suite of 
powers that may be used to incentivize or compel information 
dissemination from government entities166 or private parties.167 
 A home for constitutions as meta-instruments is not without at 
least cursory contemplation within the literature.  We might consider 
constitutions as falling within the procedural instrument category of 
instrument choice theory, which includes institution creation and 
reform.168  The specific policy instruments chosen by policy makers 
and the processes through which they utilize them are termed 
“subsystems.”169  Constitutions, then, are the “policy supersystems” 
within which policy subsystems are situated.  In this way, change to the 
policy supersystem of constitutional governance may necessitate the 
use of policy subsystems to achieve institutional or constitutional 
reform.  So, for example, one way to change the structure of the 
constitutional supersystem in the United States is to have either two-
thirds of both houses of Congress or two-thirds of state governments 
propose a constitutional amendment, which then must be ratified by 
three-quarters of state governments.170  This is action that utilizes 
procedural instruments within a policy subsystem to adjust the 
constitutional supersystem.  Without such an adjustment, the constitu-
tional supersystem may constrain the use of certain instruments like 
prescriptive regulation at certain levels of government. 
                                                 
 162. Such as through the Commerce Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 163. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 164. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 165. Id. amend. V.  The powers of eminent domain, common law doctrines like 
nuisance and the public trust doctrine, and powers based on the state’s police power to protect 
the public, like zoning authority, provide other examples.  See generally Hudson, Nested 
Commons Governance, supra note 61 (describing the operation of nested natural capital 
commons created by some federal structures). 
 166. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(2012). 
 167. In the environmental context, ecolabeling requirements provide an example.  
RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 156, at 74. 
 168. Howlett, supra note 140, at 36. 
 169. Id. at 38. 
 170. U.S. CONST. art. V.  Another way to adjust the constitutional superstructure is 
through new judicial interpretations of constitutional text. 
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 Just as with policy design more broadly, policy scholars of the 
sociological and historical neoinstitutionalism mold have keyed on the 
role of institutions in guiding instrument choice, noting that “[t]he 
choice of policy instruments depends on the institutional context of the 
actors involved.”171  Constitutional federalism is clearly the concrete 
context in which policy making occurs across scales in countries like 
the United States and Canada, and the decentralized governance 
promoted by this more potent form of federalism (being constitutional 
rather than merely political in form) dictates many of the policy-tool 
trade-offs in a variety of subject areas, including private forestry, 
nonpoint source pollution, and land-use planning more generally. 
 Furthermore, this institutional context explains why constitutional 
structure and value preference for relatively strong decentralized 
federalism in these subject areas is so hard to change:  “instrument 
(re)design is never an isolated choice; it is always linked to a historical 
process.”172  In this way, “The rationality of participants in the [policy] 
design process is not only rationally bounded, but also bound to an 
institutional context.”173  Thus, institutional context combined with 
rationality might be considered a form of “reasonable rationality.”174  
The dilemma presented by reasonable rationality is thus: 
On the one hand, neglecting institutions may lead to unviable 
instruments that cannot be successfully advocated and implemented; on 
the other hand, designing in perfect conformity with existing 
institutions may drastically reduce the scope of instrument choices as 
well as the possibility of developing solutions contributing efficiently to 
induce changes in behaviour likely to solve problems . . . .175 
This is the case, for example, in land-use regulatory areas in the United 
States, such as nonpoint source water pollution, subnational forestry, 
isolated wetlands, and direct land-use planning activities generally.  In 
these areas, if we ignore constitutional constraints—for example, 
constraints on federal authority to prescriptively intervene with 
                                                 
 171. Réjean Landry & Frédéric Varone, The Choice of Policy Instruments:  
Confronting the Deductive and the Interactive Approaches, in DESIGNING GOVERNMENT:  
FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 106, 114; accord Peter A. Hall & 
Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 
936 (1996); Réjean Landry, Rational Choice and Canadian Policy Studies, in POLICY STUDIES 
IN CANADA:  THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 80, at 170. 
 172. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 114. 
 173. Id. at 115. 
 174. Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, Rediscovering Reasonable Rationality in Institutional 
Analysis, 29 EUR. J. POL. RES. 31 (1996). 
 175. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 115. 
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minimum standards in the event that subnational governments refuse 
to act—we might advocate for unviable instruments that ultimately fail 
for a number of reasons.  First, the policy may not garner enough 
political support for enactment.  Or, even if political support exists, the 
policy is passed by a legislature, and is even implemented by executive 
agencies, the policy might fail when challenged constitutionally by 
private property owners or subnational governments.  On the other 
hand, if we were to develop instruments in line with a constitutionally 
dualistic institutional state of affairs,176 then these instruments would 
not be robust enough to change behavior.  We see this, for example, 
with regard to the numerous voluntary programs aimed at subnational 
forest and coastal resources that have been holistically ineffectual.177 
 Ultimately, though we tend to think about instrument choice in 
terms of “policy instrument choice,”178 there is a precursor to that 
inquiry that can be termed “institutional instrument choice” or, 
perhaps more precisely, “constitutional instrument choice.”  The choice 
of constitutional instrument dictates the availability of all other policy 
instruments, so evaluation of a constitutional instrument is a 
precondition to the evaluation of policy instruments if we are to gain a 
holistic approach to policy success and failure. 
E. Policy Success and Failure:  Integrating Institutional Success 
 Though there has been much study of policy failure,179 policy 
success has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature.180  Allan 
McConnell calls this oversight a “significant gap in our understanding 
of the world.”181  As noted earlier, policy success theory to date has 
divided success into three categories:  process, program, and political 
                                                 
 176. See Engel, supra note 41; Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism To 
Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters:  The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1991. 
 177. See the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012); section 
319 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012); and Forest Legacy Program:  
Protecting Private Forest Lands from Conversion to Non-Forest Uses, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/programs/loa/aboutflp.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), for 
examples and a discussion of voluntary conservation programs.  See also Jessica Owley & 
Stephen J. Tulowiecki, Who Should Protect the Forest?:  Conservation Easements in the 
Forest Legacy Program, 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47 (2012) (discussing 
conservation easements in the forest legacy program). 
 178. Landry & Varone, supra note 171, at 107. 
 179. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 21. 
 180. Id. at 3 (noting that such scholarship is limited in scope and in number to a 
handful of projects). 
 181. Id. 
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success.182  The aim of this Article, of course, is to integrate a fourth 
category, institutional success, into policy success theory. 
 Perhaps the most useful way to compare institutional success 
with prior success categorizations is to draw contrasts between 
institutional and program success, the latter of which is the primary 
way in which society thinks about policy successes and failures—that 
is, “did the policy work?”  In many ways determining program success 
is fraught with far more subjectivity than determining institutional 
success.  Reasonable people may disagree over whether the substance 
of a particular policy resulted in outcomes that matched the policy’s 
goals.  This is particularly true when policies will rarely, if ever, be 
forged out of unanimous consent.  A large number of detractors who 
never agreed with the substance of the policy to begin with will likely 
continue to view it as a failure, even if it does achieve some or all of its 
original aims.  Likewise, supporters may view, through rose-colored 
glasses, an objectively weak policy as a success.  Consider the 
continued characterization of Obamacare as a success by supporters183 
and as a failure by detractors.184  This adds political distortion on top of 
the already difficult task of objectively weighing a policy’s 
programmatic results against its purported goals. 
 Policy scholars have noted the difficulties in evaluating program 
success or failure.  Should success be evaluated in a subjective, value-
laden manner (a success to those in favor of the policy and a failure to 
those opposed to it)185 or in an objective and impartial manner (did the 
policy achieve what it set out to achieve and maximize benefits relative 
to costs)?186  The latter may be heavily data-driven and is an approach 
particularly favored among U.S. policy analysts.187  Even so, is a policy 
a success if it achieves its original goals, but those goals were 
illegitimate?188  Such may be the case, for example, if a policy is seen 
                                                 
 182. Id. at 42-43, 46, 49-54; see also Parsons, supra note 13, at 43-60 (arguing that 
evidence-based policy making enhances control of the policy-making process); Sanderson, 
supra note 13 (arguing that evidence-based policy making should include theory-based 
analysis of long-term impact). 
 183. Biden on Health Care Sign-Ups:  ‘Hell of a Start,’ CNN (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:40 
AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/20/biden-on-health-care-sign-ups-hell-of-
a-start/?hpt=hp_t2. 
 184. Josh Kraushaar, Democrats in Denial over Obamacare, NAT’L J. (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/against-the-grain/democrats-in-denial-over-obamacare-2014 
0218. 
 185. McConnell calls this the antifoundationalist position.  MCCONNELL, supra note 7, 
at 31. 
 186. McConnell calls this the foundationalist position.  Id. 
 187. Id. at 12-13. 
 188. Id. at 14. 
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as creating economic inequalities or compromising democratic 
processes.189  A further complication of determining program success 
or failure is that in the typical policy scenario a policy that is not 
considered a success is not necessarily a failure—policies can succeed 
in some ways but not in others and can be characterized as succeeding 
mostly or only in part.  Indeed, McConnell describes a spectrum from 
success to failure, noting that success is not an “all or nothing 
phenomenon” and that “[t]otal policy success is uncommon, as is total 
policy failure.”190 
 Contrast the subjectivity-fraught evaluation of program success 
with the type of institutional success upon which this Article focuses, 
which involves a relatively straightforward determination:  did the 
level of government (federal, state, or local) guiding the policy through 
the policy cycle have the legal authority to craft the policy in the first 
instance?  Did the government unconstitutionally infringe upon legally 
protected individual rights?  Determining whether legal authority 
exists or whether a constitutional right was infringed can certainly be 
litigious affairs, as proponents of the policy make arguments that a law 
or its application is constitutional and opponents make counterargu-
ments that it is not.  Once a determination is made, however, we can 
have a relative degree of certainty regarding whether a policy 
institutionally succeeds (that is, is allowed to proceed in its current 
form).  Such a determination may occur in a number of ways and quite 
often occurs at the evaluation stage through a judicial ruling.  It may 
also occur if a legislative body withdraws a policy due to the mere 
threat of legal challenge or because of political backlash.  In this way, 
analysis of constitutional authority as the focus of institutional success 
may be a much neater analysis than determination of program success 
because post-judicial ruling, there are no gradations along an 
institutional success/failure spectrum (unless, of course, the judicial 
ruling is later overturned—which is certainly a possibility and can 
make institutional success evaluation much messier).  Institutional 
success evaluation, therefore, may simplify the otherwise 
overwhelmingly complex task of policy evaluation191—a policy may 
                                                 
 189. Examples might be tax policies characterized as exacerbating wealth disparity in 
the United States, see Jillian Berman, Income Inequality Greatly Exacerbated By U.S. Tax 
System:  Study, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2013, 1:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/06/17/income-inequality-tax-system_n_3454216.html, or corporations having the 
same constitutionally protected right to participate in campaign contribution activities as do 
individual citizens, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 190. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 55. 
 191. See id. at 160-95. 
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either institutionally fail with 100% certainty if it is found that a level 
of government maintains no authority or unconstitutionally infringes 
on individual rights, or it may institutionally succeed with 100% 
certainty.  A new debate may ensue subsequent to that determination to 
try to adjust those outcomes, and new arguments regarding 
constitutional interpretation may be put forth and eventually 
accepted.192  But for the time after a judicial ruling until a change in 
such ruling, a policy’s institutional success or failure is determinable. 
 Not only may institutional success analysis be more clean-cut, but 
it also may provide more information regarding the viability of policies 
across a wide range of subject matter.  McConnell posits that there are 
numerous reasons why the study of policy success is important, 
including discerning insights regarding “the transferability of 
conditions for success to other sectors and jurisdictions[,] the capacity 
of successful programmes to be enduring[,] whether we are more 
liable to learn from successes or failures[, and] our ability to predict 
success.”193  While each of these insights may be of varying degrees of 
utility regarding program success, because there are so many variables 
distinguishing the substance of differing policies, the utility of these 
insights for an assessment of institutional success is more straight-
forward.  With this Article’s narrow definition of institutional 
success—that is, legal authority for a level of government to craft and 
implement a particular regulatory policy without constraint—these 
propositions form into something more definite.  First, once there is a 
judicial ruling on constitutional authority or a constitutional change in 
an institution to reallocate legal authority, we gain fairly direct 
understandings of how to apply that constitutional principle or change 
that institution in other contexts.  As Allan McConnell notes, there is 
an argument that in the “federal states versus unitary states” category 
of political science study “any two countries . . . might share 
substantial similarities.  Hence, there is some chance, all things being 
equal, that what works in one context will be of value in another.”194  
This is definitely the case as between the United States and Canada, 
for example, where the constitutional constraints on one federal 
government in the subnational forest management context may tell us 
a great deal about those constraints in the other country.195  Second, we 
                                                 
 192. See Brigham Daniels & Blake Hudson, Our Constitutional Commons, 49 GA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 193. MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at 196. 
 194. Id. at 200. 
 195. See Hudson, supra note 138. 
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also learn with some degree of certainty whether a policy program will 
be enduring—if there is no legal authority, then we know that it will 
not endure.  If there is legal authority, then overall endurance depends 
on a number of other factors related to programmatic and political 
success.  Third, as noted earlier, in the institutional context success and 
failure are more directly characterized as flip sides of the same coin.  If 
there is no legal authority to act, then we learn equally from this as 
both a lack of success and as a failure.  And finally, what we learn 
about constitutional conflicts and institutional design characteristics 
can help us predict ways to achieve institutional successes in the 
future. 
 In the final analysis, because the rules for processes, programs, 
and politics ultimately emanate from constitutions, establishing 
successful institutions is critical to the success of the other dimensions.  
While institutional authority for a certain level of government to 
formulate policy cannot guarantee process, program, or political 
success, lack of institutional authority can guarantee policy failure, at 
least in that form and at that level of government.  It guarantees failure 
in that form because a government could certainly utilize 
nonprescriptive, voluntary measures as the policy instrument or pay 
compensation to private property owners if it is able to do so.  In other 
words, there are other policy forms the government could utilize.  Lack 
of institutional authority guarantees failure at that level of government 
because the same policy, if prescriptive, may be adopted by other 
levels of government.  Even so, nonprescriptive approaches may not be 
efficacious, governments may not be able to pay just compensation 
and may abandon the policy, and other levels of government may not 
engage in policy making on that subject matter. 
 With constitutional authority as the focus, what must be 
determined is whether it does or does not exist and whether its exercise 
does or does not infringe on constitutionally protected rights.  So, for 
example, if the federal government is found not to have constitutional 
authority to maintain prescriptive inputs into certain regulatory areas, 
then both proponents and opponents would see attempts by the federal 
government to so regulate as failures—proponents would do so 
begrudgingly while opponents would do so gladly.  As McConnell 
describes: 
A policy fails insofar as it does not achieve the goals that proponents set 
out to achieve.  Those supportive of the original goals are liable to 
perceive, with regret, an outcome of policy failure.  Opponents are also 
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likely to perceive failures, with satisfaction, because they did not 
support the original goals.196 
Take the case of Morrison as an illustration.  Proponents of the 
Violence Against Women Act would reluctantly admit that the policy 
had institutionally failed due to the Supreme Court’s finding of a lack 
of federal constitutional authority (though they may disagree with that 
judicial interpretation).  Those opposed to the policy and the 
corresponding expanded degree of federal authority would also 
perceive the policy as a failure—and justifiably so in their view.  
Integrating institutional analysis earlier in the policy cycle can help 
governments turn these types of institution-driven policy failures into 
policy successes.  These policy successes, in turn, can tell us a great 
deal more about better policy making in the future than can ex post 
analysis of policy failures. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES FOR 
POLICY SUCCESS:  COASTAL ZONE AND PRIVATE FOREST 
MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES 
 The mechanisms this Article develops for integrating institutional 
analysis into the policy success framework may be applied to a wide 
variety of policy subject areas, from civil rights to intellectual property 
to international law and beyond.  They can also be applied to a variety 
of national governance structures—in particular, federal systems with 
constitutional constraints similar to those in the United States.  There 
are two areas in the United States where vulnerabilities are likely to 
play a substantial role in impeding policy success.  These subject areas 
are within the environmental policy and land-use planning arenas and 
include the role of coastal land-use planning and subnational forest 
management in responding to climate change.  Remedying 
institutional vulnerabilities in these areas will be critical if society is to 
design policies that both mitigate and adapt to climate change effects 
in the coming decades. 
A. Land Use in the Coastal Zone 
 As described in this Subpart, new approaches to land-use 
planning in the coastal zone will be critical to adapting to climate 
change effects.  As sea levels rise and disaster events like hurricane-
induced flooding increase, municipalities, industrial developments, 
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and other entities in close proximity to the coast must make difficult 
choices on how to adapt to the inevitably rising tide.  Society will not 
only need to move away from vulnerable parts of the coast, but when 
settlement or development occurs further inland, it will need to 
proceed in a new way.  Society must learn from the development 
mistakes of the past and establish new, more robust buffer zones 
between the new coastline and future development.  Society will also 
need to set aside more natural capital in developments through better 
use of density requirements or urban growth boundaries.  Such new 
and, some would say, radical approaches to land-use planning will be 
necessary if society is to forestall the worst effects of climate change in 
the coastal zone, which currently is home to more than half of the U.S. 
population.197 
 Coastal land-use planning implicates both types of constitutional 
vulnerability highlighted in Part II.  First, direct land-use planning in 
the United States exemplifies constraints on governance authority at 
various levels of government perhaps better than any other subject 
matter.  In the United States, the regulatory authority to engage in 
direct land-use planning on private lands, which is critical to 
controlling development, reigning in urban sprawl, and protecting 
natural capital, is currently placed completely under the control of state 
governments (though it may be granted to local governments under 
home rule laws).198  The Supreme Court has made reference to “the 
States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”199 describing 
land-use regulation as “a quintessential state and local power.”200 
 Congress actually exempts a number of activities from federal 
statutes in order to avoid federal “intrusion” into land-use planning.  
Consider the example of nonpoint source water pollution under the 
                                                 
 197. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L 
OCEAN SERV.:  POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES:  1980-2008 (2004). 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 21; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 
(1887); JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public 
Good:  The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 
IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003); James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural 
Resource Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010). 
 199. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994), for 
the proposition that “regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local 
governments”). 
 200. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the 
quintessential state activity.”)). 
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Clean Water Act, which is unregulated at the federal level but also the 
greatest contributor to water quality impairment in the United States.201  
Again, federal hesitancy is due in part to conceptions of exclusive state 
and local authority over land-use regulation,202 leaving states as the 
“exclusive regulators of nonpoint source pollution.”203  The role of 
nonpoint source water pollution regulation in complicating the policy-
making process has been highlighted in the policy studies literature.204  
Policy scholars have used the case study of nonpoint source pollution 
to explore the many characteristics that define particular policy 
problems,205 which can tell us much about coastal land-use planning 
more generally.  One of these characteristics is “interdependencies,” 
which implicates whether a problem cuts vertically across scales of 
governance or horizontally across agencies within the same level of 
governance.  The interdependencies in coastal land-use planning 
related to climate change are vast, as the problems cut vertically across 
scales of governance and horizontally across entities within the same 
level of governance. 
 In fact, the issue of interdependencies is of particular relevance to 
the role of constitutions in the policy-making process.  Scholars have 
noted that land-use planning (such as the control of nonpoint source 
water pollution) gives rise to more interdependencies than other policy 
areas, primarily because it cuts across a variety of sectors, such as 
environmental protection, commercial and residential development, 
agriculture, forestry, and local zoning.  In this way, land-use planning 
is a problem that is especially prone to cutting vertically across 
scales—the federal government is implicated in agricultural policy 
while state and local governments are responsible for land-use 
planning and zoning—as well as horizontally across federal agencies 
and thousands of subnational governments within the same scale.  The 
role of governance authority across and within scales is significant and 
is perhaps the ultimate backdrop to the intractability of the coastal 
land-use problem.  State and local governments perceive a sphere of 
                                                 
 201. Nonpoint Source Pollution:  The Nation’s Largest Water Quality Problem, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/outreach/point1.cfm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2015). 
 202. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:  
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 27 (2002). 
 203. Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National?  The Increasing Federalization of 
Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 179 (2000). 
 204. Peters & Hoornbeek, supra note 99, at 86-105. 
 205. Id. at 86-99. 
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land-use regulatory authority protected from federal interference, and 
thus far, the federal government has been unwilling to test that 
assertion of constitutional authority. 
 Though policy scholars have overlooked the role of constitutional 
federalism in driving the failure to craft nonpoint source water 
pollution policies, “the current move toward decentralized and 
nonregulatory policy instruments in nonpoint-source water-pollution 
control may find grounding in the political and causal complexity of 
the problems involved, in their broad scope, and in their significant 
policy interdependence.”206  The same may be said of coastal land-use 
planning in a time of climate change.  If state and local governments 
continue to act individually rational but collectively deficient in efforts 
to adapt, then needed adjustments in development patterns are unlikely 
to occur, increasing the risk of human, economic, and natural capital 
losses as sea levels rise.  The federal government will likely need to 
step in and coordinate retreat from the most vulnerable areas.  If it is 
unable to do so, then an unmitigated policy failure looms on the 
horizon. 
 Yet, it is not only constitutional constraints on federal authority 
that expose the governance authority constitutional vulnerability in the 
coastal land-use planning context.  The federal government has made 
attempts to quash state and local authority over zoning authority for the 
siting and permitting of oil refineries and other utilities,207 and states 
have succeeded in stripping local governments of authority to do so.208  
Each of these categories of action is based on claimed constitutional 
powers of preemption.  This could have damaging impacts on the 
abilities of lower levels of government to move infrastructure out of 
high-risk areas or to preserve natural capital as a buffer to climate-
related disaster events.  In other areas, local governments are losing 
autonomy that could be useful for adapting to climate change through 
land-use planning as states are “transfer[ing] authority over armoring 
from local to state control.”209  Each of these governance authority 
                                                 
 206. Id. at 104. 
 207. See Gasoline for America’s Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. 
§ 102(b)(1) (2005); Engel, supra note 41, at 185. 
 208. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2006); 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85. 
 209. J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed:  Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and 
Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 97 n.127 (2012) (citing Connecticut’s Act Concerning the Coastal 
Management Act and Shoreline Flood and Erosion Control Structures, S.B. 376, 2012 Reg. 
Sess. (Conn. 2012); Maryland’s Living Shoreline Protection Act of 2008, MD. CODE ANN., 
ENVIR. § 16-201 (West 2014)). 
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vulnerabilities needs to be remedied in order to facilitate coastal land-
use planning policy successes. 
 The individual rights vulnerability plays a particularly acute role 
in land-use planning in the coastal zone, especially as related to 
climate change adaptation.  Consider the Lucas case described in Part 
II.B.  If states or municipalities wish to prevent further development in 
areas likely to be inundated, and doing so wipes out certain forms of 
economic development value of a landowner’s property, the 
government would be hard-pressed to defend a takings claim.  Peter 
Byrne has highlighted a number of other ways in which this 
vulnerability may play out.210  Takings claims may be brought by 
property owners if the state renourishes beaches and claims the 
reclaimed beach as public property;211 regulations prohibit property 
owners from armoring their properties to combat rising seas;212 
governments construct levees that send floodwaters to other 
properties;213 governments refuse to construct levees to protect some 
property owners even though they construct them for others;214 
governments find it necessary to breach levees in certain locations to 
avoid worse flood damage elsewhere;215 state or local governments 
mandate retreat from rising seas by “prohibiting, limiting, or 
conditioning new development or rebuilding” (as was the case in 
Lucas);216 or governments fail to maintain access to “marooned” 
property by refusing to rebuild roads or bridges that are continually 
wiped away through erosive forces or other storm and sea level rise 
impacts.217  Ultimately, as with the governance authority vulnerability, 
this constitutional rights institutional vulnerability will need to be 
remedied in order to achieve coastal land-use planning policy 
successes and to avoid the worst impacts of climate change along the 
coast. 
B. Subnational Forestry 
 Forests are critical to combatting climate change.  Twenty percent 
of yearly carbon emissions worldwide over the last few decades are 
                                                 
 210. See Byrne, supra note 209. 
 211. Id. at 82 (discussing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)). 
 212. Id. at 88, 100-01. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 91-92. 
 215. Id. at 91. 
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attributable to deforestation and forest degradation.218  Forest cover in 
the United States has been fairly stable over the past century,219 but new 
threats loom.  For example, the United States Forest Service’s 2011 
Southern Forests Futures Project Summary Report220 detailed that 
population growth, climate change, changes in timber markets, and 
invasive species will remove copious amounts of forest resources in 
the coming decades.221  Urban development in particular is projected to 
consume thirty to forty-three million acres of southern land by 2060, 
while contributing to total forest losses of up to twenty-three million 
acres, which is approximately 13% of all southern forestland.222  A key 
driver of these threats is the combination of lax land-use planning in 
the South and the fact that 86% of southern forests are privately 
owned.223  Sixty percent of forests are privately owned nationwide, and 
the federal government only maintains direct inputs into the 35% of 
U.S. forests in federal ownership.224 
 The division of governance authority between state and federal 
governments in the area of land-use planning, thoroughly discussed in 
the previous Subpart, plays a key role in preventing the federal 
government from curbing state rationality in this area.  As Gerald Rose 
has noted, “Under the US Constitution, the federal government has 
limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for 
the states.  Forestland management and use was one such reserved 
power.”225  In other words, regulation of 60% of U.S. forests and 
protection of those resources from urban sprawl and other 
development or resource extraction impacts is the responsibility of 
fifty states and nearly 88,000 subnational governments in the United 
                                                 
 218. CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI, GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES:  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 6 (2010). 
 219. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 156, at 1198-1200. 
 220. David N. Wear & John G. Greis, The Southern Forest Futures Project:  Summary 
Report, USDA S. FOREST FUTURES (May 12, 2011), http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/ 
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 221. Id. at 4. 
 222. Id. at 35.  See generally Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH & 
LEE L. REV. 1643 (2014) (discussing the destruction of southern forests). 
 223. Wear & Greis, supra note 220, at 62. 
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States226—absent any federal regulatory forest-management inputs.  
Whether these constitutional constraints on federal authority are real or 
illusory is uncertain because it is unclear if the federal government 
cannot legally act, or if rather it simply refuses politically to act out of 
perceived legal constraints.  Regardless, the institutional vulnerability 
remains. 
 The interrelation between land-use planning and forest manage-
ment has become far more complicated in recent decades, even as 
climate change has brought attention to the growing importance of 
forest resources.  Between 1998 and 2010, large commercial timber 
companies in the southeastern United States have rapidly divested their 
timber holdings, resulting in smaller forested properties that are 
“subject to new dynamic forces that encourage parcelization and 
fragmentation.”227  This transition has been described as “the most 
substantial transition in forest ownership of the last century,” as 
industry sold nearly three-quarters of its forest holdings.228  Much of 
this forestland was purchased by real estate investment trusts 
(REITs).229  Most REITs are interested primarily in the commercial 
value of the land upon which the timber exists for commercial, 
residential, or industrial development.230  The timber is merely 
incidental to property ownership, and as a result these forestlands are 
now subject to increased development pressures seeking to replace 
forest resources with urban sprawl.231 
 If a large number of states continue to refuse to protect forest 
resources from the impacts of urban sprawl and other development 
over the next fifty years, the federal government will need to do so.  
Such protections may necessarily seek to “keep forests forested” 
through the use of regulatory instruments like growth boundaries and 
limit lines around large municipalities,232 development-density 
requirements establishing preservation of forests on certain acreages of 
property,233 or stand-density and clear-cutting requirements aimed at 
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industries engaged in forestry activities,234 among a variety of other 
prescriptive policies.  Yet, these are regulatory roles currently reserved 
to subnational governments.235  And in many areas, such as the U.S. 
South, the most basic of forest preservation standards are not even 
utilized—most southern states rely almost entirely on voluntary best 
management practices.236  There are certainly arguments that the 
federal government might prescriptively reach these areas under its 
Commerce Clause power to establish a minimum standards 
framework,237 but that premise simply has not been tested because 
Congress has never attempted to prescriptively regulate subnational 
forests. 
 Furthermore, as with land-use planning in the coastal zone, not 
only may the federal government be constrained by subnational actors, 
but local governments who wish to manage forests to combat climate 
change may be prevented from doing so if states preempt their 
management activities under the pretense of fostering commercial, 
residential, industrial, or other economic developments within their 
borders.  These are each institutional vulnerabilities that may inhibit 
much needed forest management policy success in the coming 
decades.238 
 The constitutional infringement vulnerability, in the form of Fifth 
Amendment takings claims, could theoretically be implicated if 
federal, state, or local governments prohibit forest operations on 
smaller parcels or require certain stand-density requirements that 
would prohibit the cutting of virtually any trees.  This is both an 
unlikely policy response and a claim that would be unlikely to succeed 
at the federal level if other economic values were preserved on the 
property.239  At the state level, however, such claims may have even 
more purchase if states require compensation for regulations that 
devalue property by a certain degree.240  A number of other difficult 
questions may arise.  What if a REIT owns forested property outside a 
newly instituted growth boundary?  Forest preservation regulations 
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could effectively eviscerate almost all of the REIT’s economic value in 
the land if they are unable to develop the property as originally 
planned or sell it to another for those purposes.  So while this type of 
institutional vulnerability may be less cause for concern in the forest 
management context, its potential to undermine policy and 
institutional success remains. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the nature of a policy space and its history are 
prerequisites of successful design.241 
 In many systems of government, policy making occurs within a 
policy space created by constitutional institutions.  These institutions 
have a history and are driven by an inertia that affects the viability of 
certain regulatory instruments.  If policy makers are constrained in 
utilizing those regulatory instruments by constitutional rules of 
governance or provision of individual rights, then important policies 
that have already been designed and implemented may fail or may not 
even be crafted in the first instance at appropriate levels of governance.  
Understanding these effects and adjusting constitutional institutions 
accordingly is a precondition for policy success. 
 To be clear, particular constitutional rules of governance or 
provisions of individual rights may certainly have had value at one 
time.  Today, however, policy makers have new information regarding 
the supply, utilization, scientific function, and value of certain 
resources, like forests, wetlands, biodiversity, and other resources 
readily replaced by development.  As a result, for certain regulatory 
areas, such as the intersection of land-use planning and natural 
resource protection, those constitutional rules and protections are 
outdated and archaic.  Even though these institutions carry the heavy 
weight of historical inertia, such inertia “does not mean . . . that 
choices are inevitable or immutable or that substantial shifts in 
implementation styles do not occur.”242  In other words, institutions like 
constitutions can change, either through textual changes to the 
constitution itself or through changes in constitutional interpretation. 
 This Article seeks to infuse constitutional analysis into the policy 
literature by framing constitutions as meta-institutions central to 
process, program, and political policy success.  Integrating “institu-
tional analysis” into the policy cycle literature, “institutional design” 
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into the policy design literature, “meta-instruments” into the 
instrument choice literature, and “institutional success” into the policy 
success literature will be necessary to forge a holistic understanding of 
policy making that is based more upon learning from success, rather 
than only from failure. 
